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AM CURIOUSLY weak, weak as if I were recovering from a long
Ilness. I begin to feel it more in my head. I sleep well and eat well;
but I write a half a dozen words and turn faint and sick.
-Charles Dickens's reaction to the crash of a train in
which he was traveling that killed and injured numerous
passengers, but left him without physical injury.'
Mental anguish and illness following a severe trauma is axio-
matic in the field of medicine and psychiatry. The legal profes-
sion, however, exhibits an understandable reluctance to accept
mental pain or illness as a recoverable injury in a tort action.
This reluctance stems from the fear that allowing recovery for
such injury, notwithstanding the foreseeability on the part of a
wrongdoer that such an injury can result from certain malfea-
sance, will cause a flood of fictitious, speculative claims that
would be too difficult to prove or refute. Nevertheless, recov-
eries for psychological injuries can be significant and, despite
the cautious skepticism attendant to such injuries, they present
increasing challenges and problems for plaintiffs and defend-
ants in tort litigation.
Among the various mental disorders, Posttraumatic Stress Dis-
order (PTSD) has emerged as a "designer" mental disorder al-
* Partner in Pangia & Hansen based in Washington, D.C. Certified as a spe-
cialist in civil litigation by the National Board of Trial Advocacy. Formerly, assis-
tant chief counsel for litigation, FAA, and Senior Trial Attorney and head of
Aviation Trial Unit of U.S. Dept. of Justice.
I George Mendelson, The Concept of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Review, 10
INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 45, 48 (1987). It is important to note that some jurisdic-
tions will not allow a recovery for emotional injury without an accompanying
physical injury. Others allow recovery for those "in the zone of danger," and
some have expanded beyond that. The applicable law and conflicts of law, be-
yond the scope of this article, must be determined. This article presumes that
this threshold question is answered in the affirmative.
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leged in an increasing number of tort cases. It has been
observed that: "[n]o diagnosis in the history of American psychi-
atry has had a more dramatic and pervasive impact on law and
social justice than post-traumatic stress disorder."' There are
several reasons for this. Undoubtedly, the primary reason is the
development of diagnostic criteria for mental disorders gener-
ally, lending to the field of mental health care an appearance of
objective standards which previously did not exist. PTSD in par-
ticular has become such a popular issue in lawsuits in part, be-
cause the published criteria for a clinical diagnosis, as set out
later, embodies in and of itself the diagnosis of a causal element
usually related to a specific traumatic event. Thus, unlike most
other mental disorders, the diagnosis of PTSD itself, if accepted,
embodies and tends to presume a proximate cause relating to
the subject tort. Another reason is an increasing public accept-
ance of the fact that certain types of trauma do indeed cause
significant mental disorders in persons who are otherwise nor-
mal. Additionally, the criteria for the diagnosis of PTSD has un-
dergone recent changes, allowing for a broader category of
types of causal or triggering events.
Quite often, the plaintiff's lawyer representing a PTSD client
does not fully understand the nature and extent of the intrusive
force a PTSD victim experiences by the injury. Indeed, often
the victim or the victim's family even does not comprehend why
the past event continues to so adversely affect them.
"[Tihose who do not feel pain, seldom think that it is felt."4
It is particularly challenging to convince a jury of the exist-
ence of an injury that cannot readily be seen, or that is seldom
experienced by the average person. This article presents some
guidelines and personal observations that may be helpful in this
regard.
The defense in these cases is confronted with the prospect
that PTSD is over-diagnosed, over-treated, and perhaps even ag-
2 Herbert C. Modlin, Traumatic Neurosis and Other Injuries, 6 PSYCHIATRIC CLIN-
ics N. AM. 661, 662 (1983), (predicting that PTSD would surface with increasing
frequency in catastrophic accident cases). The Modlin article focuses on estab-
lishing the validity of PTSD claims.
3 Alan A. Stone, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Law: Critical Review of the
New Frontier, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRIC L. 23, 23 (1993).
4 Samuel Johnson,Journal entry 48 (Sept. 1, 1750), in 3 THE RAMBLER 258, 259
(W.J. Bate & Albrecht B. Strauss eds., 1969).
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gravated by the existence of the litigation itself.5 Of course, the
question of malingering arises in these cases either in whole or
in part by the exaggeration of symptoms. Are the reported
symptoms fabricated for the sake of maximizing a recovery?
Many defense lawyers and insurers too often jump to that con-
clusion and develop personal biases that tend to discredit com-
pletely, to their peril, many serious PTSD cases rather than
meeting claims with a realistic defense approach. Thus, some of
the material and observations presented herein may be helpful
to the defense as well.
A conceptual definition of PTSD includes: a complex, varying
psychological and biological response to an acute stressor, ex-
perienced directly or indirectly, or to chronic stress.6 It can de-
velop from a tragic event such as a life threatening accident and
can have a seriously debilitating effect on the way a person func-
tions with friends, family, occupation and nearly every aspect of
one's life. Although some victims may exaggerate symptoms,
PTSD is quite real. In World War I it was called "shell shock."
In World War II, PTSD was recognized as "combat fatigue." For
almost a decade, it was "traumatic neurosis" or "psychic
trauma. '7 It even was known as "railway spine," because it was
thought that the mental or personality change of a railway
worker accident victim may have had something to do with com-
pression of the spine. All of these terms have been collected
under the present terminology, posttraumatic stress disorder,
which appeared for the first time in 1980 in the third edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM). The DSM, first published in 1952, classifies mental and
personality disorders. It is currently in its fourth edition. It is
the authority used in psychiatry for diagnoses and provides ex-
panding diagnostic criteria for PTSD, under a broad category of
Anxiety Disorders.'
Since PTSD first appeared in the DSM, the most significant
expansion of its diagnosis is in the type of threshold event neces-
5 SeeJames T. Brown, Compensation Neurosis Rides Again: A Practitioner's Guide to
Defending PTSD Claims, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 467, 469 (1996).
6 SeeJane Symes, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: An Evolving Concept, 9:4 ARCHVES
PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 195, 197 (1995).
7 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY (1994).
8 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
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sary for a PTSD finding. The DSM-III 9 and DSM-III-R ° required
that the triggering event evoke significant symptoms of distress
in most people, and generally be "outside the range of usual
human experience."" Examples include events outside of sim-
ple bereavement, chronic illness, business losses or marital con-
flicts. The diagnosis of PTSD under the DSM-III and DSM-III-R
began with an identification of the stressor as being an experi-
ence such as rape or assault, military combat, flood or earth-
quake, torture, death camp, or an accidental man-made disaster
such as a large fire, sudden collapse of a building, serious auto-
mobile accident, or aircraft accident regardless of the presence
of physical injury.12
The DSM-IV deleted the requirement of the event occurring
outside the range of normal human experience. It now requires
instead that the person "experienced, witnessed, or was con-
fronted with an event or events that involved actual or
threatened death or serious injury, or that a threat to the physi-
cal integrity of self or others"13 and, "the person's response in-
volved intense fear, helplessness, or horror."' 4 Additions to the
examples of events contained in the diagnostic include natural
as well as man-made disasters and being diagnosed with a life-
threatening illness. 15 Witnessed events may include "observing a
serious injury or unnatural death of another person due to vio-
lent assault, accident, war, or disaster or unexpectedly witness-
ing a dead body or body parts."16 Events experienced by others
that are learned about may include such things as "violent per-
sonal assault, serious accident, or serious injury experienced by
a family member or a close friend; learning about the sudden,
unexpected death of a family member or a close friend; or
learning that one's child has a life-threatening disease."17 The
disorder may be especially severe or long lasting when the stres-
sor is of human design rather than one of natural causes. 8 The
9 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed., 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III].
10 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed., rev., 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
11 DSM-III, supra note 9, at 236; DSM-III-R, supra note 10, at 247.
12 See DSM-III, supra note 9, at 236; DSM-III-R, supra note 10, at 247.
13 DSM-IV, supra note 8, at 427.
14 Id. at 428.
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intensity may increase as the intensity of the event itself in-
creases or the physical proximity to the event increases.19
It should be noted that PTSD may occur in persons "who pre-
viously had not the slightest psychiatric [or emotional] diffi-
culty" whatsoever. 20 However, it is important not to assume that
a person who has developed a mental disorder after a disaster is
a person who was mentally or emotionally deficient before the
disaster.21 Likewise, it should never be assumed that the strong
person will survive a catastrophic accident emotionally un-
scathed.22 Those who maintain that emotional problems after
tragic events, such as an aircraft crash, are indicators of a pre-
existing weakness in the victim, either have never experienced a
truly stressful event themselves or have never studied the sub-
ject. It should be kept in mind that by definition, the disorder is
caused by a stress producing event that is likely to produce psy-
chological trauma in most normal individuals.23 It has been
concluded that the severity of the event itself is the important
factor and that, consequently, even individuals with no earlier
mental problems could be adversely affected by the level of
stress producing this type of injury.24 Therefore, PTSD is not
the result of a predisposition, or a so called thin skin. Rather, it
is the result of exposure to extreme emotional stress that often
occurs in the average human being subjected to events like
those listed above. It has been noted that there is little or no
evidence that predisposition is a primary factor in predicting the
development of PTSD in certain individuals. Although the
symptoms and treatment required may relate to an individual's
19 See id. at 424.
20 MARTIN BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF THE LAW § 5.2, at
105 (2d ed. 1982).
21 It has been observed that the anger which is so often suppressed in the trau-
matic situation goes underground only to return as a most permanent challenge
to the future adjustment of the subject. See BESSEL A. VAN DER KOLK, POST-TRAu-
MATIC STRESS DISORDER: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICAL SEQUELAE 19 (1984).
22 See Mardi Horowitz, Disasters & Psychiatric Response to Stress, 15:3 PSYCHIATRIC
ANNALS 166, 166 (1985).
23 Those persons who consider a show of distress to be evidence of weakness
have been referred to as "hidden victims" of a disaster. See Charles B. Wilkinson,
Aftermath of a Disaster: The Collapse of the Hyatt Regency Hotel Skywalks, 140 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1134, 1134-39 (1983).
24 See Nancy C. Andreasen, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXT-
BOOK OF PSYCHIATRY IV 918, 918-19 (Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sadock eds.,
4th ed. 1985).
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background and past experiences, every normal human being
can develop PTSD as a result of a DSM-IV threshold stressor
While most of the fundamental studies of PTSD developed
with the study of soldiers and their responses to combat exper-
iences, attention now focuses on a wider range of experiences
such as severe burns, experiences of emergency service staff,
traffic accidents, difficult child birth, experiences of critical care
nurses, or living in an area with chronic violence. 6 In fact,
some research indicates a startling fact that on the average,
about 25% of the individuals exposed to the DSM-IV defined
stressor criteria develop full blown PTSD, and that 40% of
Americans are expected to be exposed to a major traumatic
event by the age of thirty.27 Therefore, PTSD, when properly
diagnosed, is a provable injury that can result from certain tor-
tious conduct and should be considered seriously by both the
plaintiff and defense counsel.
The DSM-IV criteria provide that after the experience of a
threshold stressor, the victim re-experiences (distinguished from
simply remembering) the traumatic event in at least one of the
following ways:
(1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event,
including images, thoughts, or perceptions;
(2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event;
(3) acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring,
including illusions, hallucinations, and flashbacks;
(4) intense psychological stress at exposure to internal or exter-
nal cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the event;
or
25 See John Lipkin, Forensic Assessment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Vietnam
Veterans, 1:3 BEHAV. Sci. LAw 419 (1985); see also Bonnie L. Green et. al., Chronic
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Diagnostic Morbidity in a Disaster Sample, 180 J. NER-
VOUS MENTAL DISEASE 760, 765 (1992); RobertJ. McCaffrey et. al., Civilian-related
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Assessment-related Issues,45 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 72
(1989).
26 See, e.g., Judy Knighton et al., Research Priorities for Burn Nursing: Report of the
Psycological Issues Group, 13 J. BURN CARE REHABILITATION 97-104 (1992); Karen
Ralph &J. Alexander, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder: Borne Under Stress, 90:12 NuRs-
ING TIMES 29 (1994). One study suggests that PTSD symptoms can develop in
absence of a singular triggering event, although admits that it would not meet the
diagnostic criteria of the DSM. See Michael J. Scott & Stephen G. Stradling, Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder Without the Trauma, 33 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 71, 73
(1994).
27 See BONNIE GREEN, RECENT RESEARCH ON FINDINGS OF THE DIAGNOSIS OF POST
TRAuMATIC STRESS DISORDER, POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER IN LITIGATION
(1995).
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(5) physiological reactivity or exposure to internal or external
cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the event.2 8
DSM-IV also requires persistent avoidance of the stimuli asso-
ciated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness
(not present before the trauma) as indicated by at least three of
the following:
(1) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings or conversations associated
with the trauma;
(2) efforts to avoid activities, places and people that arouse
recollections;
(3) an inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma;
(4) a remarkably diminished interest or participation in signifi-
cant activities;
(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others;
(6) restricted range of affect (for example, unable to have loving
feelings); or
(7) sense of a foreshortened future.'
Further, the subject must experience at least two of the follow-
ing symptoms that were not present before the trauma:
(1) difficulty falling or staying asleep;
(2) irritability or outbursts of anger;
(3) difficulty concentrating;
(4) hyper vigilance; or
(5) exaggerated startle response.30
Clients subjected to severe trauma have reported such things
as: "I see it happening over and over again, "I wake up hearing
the screams in my sleep," "I can't seem to stop it from happen-
ing," "I don't know what is happening to me, I never felt this way
before," "I'm a strong person, why can't I stop this from happen-
ing over and over again," "I am so scared of everything now," "I
cannot even seem to get myself together to even do the little
normal things I did before," "I can't keep my mind on my work,"
and, "I seem to be so scattered and I can't control it." Family
members and friends often report such observations as: "I can't
understand this change," "He used to have so much ambition,"
"He doesn't seem to want to even answer the phone anymore,"
"This is not him," "I have known him for years," "Believe me,
what you see on the outside is the same body, but inside there is
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a totally different person," and, "Will I ever get my daughter
back?"
It is important to note that the DSM-IV provides that the dura-
tion of the symptoms must be more than one month, and that
"[t] he disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impair-
ment in social, occupational, or other important areas of func-
tioning."'" Although treatable, PTSD has been known to last for
decades and even for life.32 Thus, in addition to the intangible
damages, such as the resulting pain and suffering, and the ef-
fects on family, business and social life, other damages, such as
the loss of income and the high cost of treatment can result in
sizable compensable damages in cases where PTSD is proven in
the courtroom."
In the initial interview with a client who has undergone an
extreme stressor, the type of which is possibly comprehended by
the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD, it is advisable to ask about feelings
and experiences along the lines of the symptom criteria set out
in the manual, without using the term "PTSD" with the client.
An attorney should not attempt a diagnosis. The DSM-IV cau-
tions that " [t] he proper use of these criteria requires specialized
clinical training that provides both a body of knowledge and
clinical skills." 34 Of course, if the client is already under care, a
study of the medical records and an interview with the care prov-
iders are essential. But, if care has not been provided, question-
ing the client may well provide the basis for advising an
evaluation with a skilled psychiatrist and, if appropriate, a pre-
scription from the psychiatrist for a regimen of care and treat-
ment. If PTSD is diagnosed, care and treatment should begin as
soon as possible since untreated PTSD seems to become more
resistant to treatment over time. The following checklist of
symptoms may be helpful in evaluating the existence and extent
of an emotional injury such as PTSD: 5
Depression
* Feeling blue
* Feeling no interest in things
" Worrying too much
31 Id. at 429.
32 See Nancy Speed et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder as a Consequence of the POW
Experience, 117:3J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 147, 152 (1989).
33 See Horowitz, supra note 22, at 166.
34 DSM-IV, supra note 8, at xix.
35 See Horowitz, supra note 22, at 166.
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* Feeling hopeless about the future
• Feeling lonely
" Feeling low in energy or slowed down
" Feelings of worthlessness
" Loss of sexual interest or pleasure
* Blaming yourself for things
* Crying easily
* Feeling of being trapped or caught
" Feeling everything is an effort
* Thoughts of ending your life
Anxiety
* Feeling tense or keyed-up
* Heart pounding or racing
" Nervousness or shakiness inside
" Trembling
" Suddenly scared for no reason
* Feeling fearful
* Spells or terror or panic
* Feeling so restless you couldn't sit still
* Feeling that familiar things are strange or unreal
* Feeling pushed to get things done
Obsessive-Compulsive Behavior
" Trouble concentrating
* Your mind going blank
" Unwanted thoughts, words, or ideas that won't leave your
mind
* Having to check and double-check what you do
* Having to do things very slowly to insure correctness
* Difficulty making decisions
* Feeling blocked in getting things done
* Having to repeat the same actions such as touching, count-
ing, washing
* Trouble remembering things
* Worrying about sloppiness or carelessness
Anger-Hostility
* Feeling easily annoyed or irritated
" Having urges to break or smash things
* Temper outbursts that you could not control
" Shouting or throwing things
1999] 1099
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* Having urges to beat, injure, or harm someone
* Getting into frequent arguments
Somatization
* Headaches
* Numbness or tingling in parts of your body
" Feeling weak in parts of your body
" Heavy feelings in your arms or legs
* Nausea or upset stomach
• Soreness of your muscles
* A lump in your throat
" Hot or cold spells
* Pains in your heart or chest
* Pains in lower back
* Trouble getting your breath
" Faintness or dizziness
Although a lawyer should not attempt an evaluation and de-
termination from a psychiatric standpoint, an attorney handling
a posttraumatic stress disorder case should be knowledgeable of
the elements of the psychiatric examination. A psychiatric diag-
nosis of persons without organic pathologies basically consists of
three steps: (1) gathering a personal history directly from the
patient, (2) a mental status examination whereby subjective ob-
servations are made of the subject's appearance and manner of
presentation, and (3) psychological testing to standardized
clinical impressions.3 6 The attorney may also learn first-hand of
the personal history of the client even before a visit to the psy-
chiatrist. For example, the attorney may be able to have the cli-
ent describe the way he or she is affected in daily activities as a
beginning of the preparation of the damage case. However, as
stated, the attorney should seek professional assistance before
making any final determination with regard to the existence of a
real injury.
In this regard, an attorney can make sure the client does what
is necessary to get better. As an example, in a negligent security
case, 37 an assailant came through a long neglected hole in a
fence surrounding an apartment dwelling in the District of Co-
lumbia. He made his way to an unlocked basement door, to the
36 SeeJacob D. Lindy, The Trauma Membrane and Other Clinical Concepts Derived
from Psychotherapeutic Works With Survivors of Natural Disasters, 15 PSYCHiATRIC AN-
NALS 153, 153-54 (1985).
37 Unpublished case on file with author.
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elevator, and then forced his way into a young girl's apartment,
making her perform sexual acts at knife point. During her in-
terview with me, she reluctantly admitted she was experiencing
frightening dreams, recurring intrusive thoughts, sexual dys-
function and feelings of helplessness. She was ashamed of these
symptoms, feeling that she was to blame for a weakness in her
personality. She never thought of seeking professional help and
would never have mentioned these post-event problems were it
not for the attorney-client interview. She was comforted by the
fact that these feelings were not abnormal. I referred her to a
psychiatrist who, after two separate evaluations, concluded that
she had developed PTSD, but with a very good prognosis for
early recovery. She began a course of treatment that amelio-
rated most of the symptoms well before the trial of her case.
Handling a case involving posttraumatic stress disorder can in
itself be stressful. Before deciding to take on one of these cases
with all of the attending difficulties of proof, an attorney should
prepare to deal with clients experiencing true emotional
problems, the manifestations of which can make the attorney-
client relationship very difficult. It is not uncommon for the
true PTSD client to turn on the attorney in the course of the
litigation. In fact, if a client is quite reasonable, calm, under-
standing in spirit, and easy to deal with, the attorney should be
suspicious of a lack of existence of an emotional problem. Vacil-
lation, confusion, and crying spells, interlaced by periods of un-
usual self-composure, are common manifestations of a
posttraumatic stress disorder victim. Additionally, in the respon-
sible type of individual, the trauma may be enhanced by feelings
of survivor guilt. The survivor may attribute much of the dam-
age done in the catastrophic event to some small idiosyncratic
decision on his or her part. In that event, it is observed that the
guilt is a way of turning a passive experience of overwhelming
helplessness into an active experience of excessive responsibility
manifested by the self question: "Why did I survive when others
did not?"3 8 Often victims feel that their suffering has some con-
jured mission which cannot be fulfilled by a monetary recovery
unless that recovery will somehow stop people from committing
the same negligence which they feel invaded their lives.
On the subject of settlement, PTSD victims often find it diffi-
cult to rationalize the concept that their experience could possi-
bly be the subject of negotiation or an equation with a monetary
38 Lindy, supra note 36, at 160.
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equivalent regardless of the amount. Therefore, in the genuine
posttraumatic stress disorder case, managing a settlement with a
client can be difficult because of these emotional problems. Un-
less there is a full understanding of the symptoms of posttrau-
matic stress disorder and a psychological preparation to deal
with them in the client, tackling this type of case can be a stress-
producing event for the plaintiff's attorney. The attorney
should be emotionally prepared (and able) to exhibit excep-
tional patience at times while handling a serious PTSD case.
Sometimes the care for the client's mental well-being as well
as the duty to provide the best legal representation, present a
conflict. For example, a victim of an airplane crash sustained
very minor physical injuries, but through the attorney-client in-
terview, he manifested an unusual denial of the event itself. He
admitted to uncontrolled fits of temper and plaguing night-
mares, yet he said "I control everything in my life. This crash
does not fit, and neither do my problems. Therefore, you see,
the crash cannot have any effect on me whatsoever." Despite his
attitude, he agreed to a psychiatric evaluation because of his in-
terest in pursuing a personal injury action. The psychiatrist de-
scribed him as a "ticking time bomb," who needed treatment,
and that the stress of the litigation would be harmful in his par-
ticular case. In consultation with the client and the psychiatrist,
it was agreed that he not pursue the case. 9 Litigation is often
necessary to obtain adequate means for care and treatment for
disorders resulting from a tort. In this case, however, litigation
would be counterproductive from a mental health standpoint.
The attorney evaluating a case may be confronted with situa-
tions where (1) treatment was not timely sought by the client,
(2) where a diagnosis of PTSD is missed by a physician, or (3)
where treatment is prematurely shortened by health care insur-
ers. Regarding treatment that may appear to be untimely
sought, it should be noted that the DSM-IV labels PTSD as
"acute" if the duration of the symptoms is less than three
months and "chronic" if the duration of the symptoms is three
months or more (this is reduced from six months which ap-
peared in the predecessor manuals). PTSD, with delayed onset,
is a proper diagnosis if the symptoms begin to occur at least six
months after the stressor. It is not unusual for the stressful epi-
sode to be followed by an incubation period from eight to sev-
39 Client interview during the course of an unpublished case (on file with
author).
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enty-two hours during which the victim appears calm and
psychologically unaffected by the traumatic event. The victim
may, in fact, perform in a competent and sometimes heroic
manner, seeing to the needs and even saving the lives of others.
Then, when the precipitating stress is well passed, a deteriora-
tion of the person's psychological well-being begins to take
place.40 For example, it has been observed that the victims of
catastrophic events, particularly those which are "human-in-
duced," generally pass through stages of initial shock and disbe-
lief, frozen fright, to anger or depression shortly after the
event.4 The disorder then evolves into a wide variety of anxie-
ties and emotional disabilities ranging from detachment or es-
trangement from other people to loss of ability to enjoy activities
to the inability to feel emotions of any type.4 2 In well-controlled
and disciplined persons, the onset of symptoms has been found
to remain latent even for several years after the stressful event."
However, it has been observed that prior attitudes, conflicts, per-
sonality styles, cultural backgrounds, and networks of social sup-
port are invariably combined with responses keyed to the
traumatic event. This makes it difficult to diagnosis what degree
of the reaction can be attributed solely to the event itself.
44
Additionally, the syndrome may be well masked by various de-
grees of denial by the victim. It has been observed that the com-
mon symptom, involuntary repetition of the catastrophe in the
victim's mind, stands in contrast to the ostensible opposite
symptoms, a massive ideational denial of the event and a general
emotional numbness.4" As an example, the symptoms of denial
40 See DSM-IV, supra note 8, at 425 (specifying PTSD with delayed onset).
41 Lindy, supra note 36, at 160.
42 See Charles B. Wilkinson & Enrique Vera, The Management and Treatment of
Disaster Victims, 15:3 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 174 (1985).
43 See Andreasen, supra note 24, at 921 (describing a Vietnam veteran with the
onset of symptoms years after his Vietnam experience).
- See Anne Hoiberg & Brian G. McCaughey, The Traumatic Aftereffects of Colli-
sion at Sea, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 70 (1984); Bessel A. van der Kolk & Charles
Ducery, Clinical Implications of the Rorschach in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in POST-
TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: PSYCHOL. BIOLOGICAL SEQUELAE 29 (1984). For an
extreme case, see Craig Van Dyke et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Thirty-Year
Delay in a World War II Veteran, 142 AMER. J. PSYCHIATRY 1070 (1985).
45 It has been observed that the classification of problems resulting from seri-
ous life events has oscillated between posttraumatic stress disorder diagnosis and
other classes of stress response syndromes which has served in the past to compli-
cate the issue which the DSM intended to resolve. See Mardi Horowitz et al., Signs
and Symptons of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 37:1 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 85,
85. Dr. Horowitz maintains that the "cardinal signs of intrusive experience and
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and emotional numbness are demonstrated by another recent
personal experience. In consultation with a survivor of a recent
air crash disaster, the prospective client expressed extreme an-
ger and hostility shortly after the accident but admittedly did
not know why or against whom it was directed: "I feel like I
could kill someone, but I don't know who - maybe I'll kill myself
- I'm so mad." Within several months after the accident, this
person began to state how he now had his life back in control,
that "the accident did not happen." "I have always planned my
life," he declared, "and this thing has no place in it. I remember
nothing. So you see, this crash did not happen." Without any
provocation, he would describe at length his well-being, inter-
spersed with versions of the same recantation of denial.46
The DSM-IV also provides for differential diagnoses. If the
stressor is not of an extreme nature or the symptomatology as
set forth in the criteria is not met in one or more aspects, the
clinician is directed to consider adjustment disorder, brief
psychotic disorder, major depressive disorder, and other disor-
ders that are not always as event-specific as PTSD. For example,
symptoms of avoidance, numbing, and increased arousal that
are not present before the suspected extreme event, do not
meet the criteria of the PTSD diagnosis, and although poten-
tially aggravated by, may not be considered the cause of a
mental disorder generally. 47 Nevertheless, Acute Stress Disorder
is also an event-related condition and a potentially recoverable
damage. Other differential diagnoses, less event-specific than
PTSD or Acute Stress Disorder, present additional challenges to
the proof of causation.
Regarding the problem of prematurely shortened care and
treatment, it can be most frustrating, and potentially detrimen-
tal, when insurance plans mandate problem-focused, short-term
treatment. Of course, there are incidents of abuses of long-term
therapy with seemingly no goal in sight, but the pendulum may
have swung the other way with HMOs and other medical plans.
Now, we are seeing individuals prematurely discharged from
needed therapy because the health care coverage mandates
short-term treatment and the visits are often "used up," denying
phases of maladaptive denial and constriction define the essential characteristics
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders." Horowitz, supra note 22, at 167.
46 See MARDI JoN HOROWITZ, STRESS RESPONSE SYNDROMES AND BRIEF PSYCHO-
THERAPY 5 (1976).
47 See DSM-IV, supra note 8, at 427.
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continuing treatment.48 Therefore, a shortened or terminated
regimen of treatment may not be an indicator of the severity of
a particular case of PTSD.
When is PTSD ever cured? The litigation of a PTSD case
would quite naturally concern the length of time of required
treatment. Is a cure ever effected? While time usually amelio-
rates most symptoms of PTSD, a cure may never completely oc-
cur. Faced with such evidence in the presentation of a PTSD
case, consideration should be given to approaching a "cure" in
relative terms. How long will psychotherapy be required and
what will it accomplish? Marital therapy may not restore a
happy marriage, but it may effect a divorce that allows the chil-
dren to be raised in a conflict-free environment and free the
spouses to go on with their lives. Their lives would be normal,
but different.49 Should a "cure" for PTSD be approached with
the same rationale? In the discovery process, it is important for
the defense to learn what goals are sought by continued psycho-
therapy, how the goals are to be attained, and how achievement
is to be measured. If the goals are not being attained within
reasonable time projections, the therapist should be questioned
on what alternatives would be considered. Our lives are chang-
ing all the time, and even the most healthy among us cannot
return to the identical physical or mental condition that existed
at a given moment in the past. Likewise, all of us have certain
normal levels of stress in our social and occupational function-
ing. The defense should seek to establish that a cure cannot be
defined as a return to stress-free functioning. Whether a return
to a reasonable ability to cope with ever-changing social and oc-
cupational situations, in this relative context, would be consid-
ered a cure, is a question that should be explored in the
discovery process.
It is also important to be aware that some advances have been
made in the pharmacotherapeutic approach for some of the
symptoms of PTSD, although there is no-definitive pharmaceuti-
cal treatment for PTSD itself. Because there is some overlap in
the symptomatology of PTSD with that of major depression and
panic disorders, drugs like tricyclic antidepressants have been
found useful in suppressing intrusive recollections and hyper-
arousal, increased startle response, irritability, and rage. But,
48 Susan Jones, Wen is the Patient Cured?, 9:4 ARCHIVES OF PSYCHIATRIC NURSING
171 (1995).
49 See MARY LEE SMITH, THE BENEFITS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY (1980).
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avoidant symptoms such as alienation, detachment and psychic
numbing rarely respond to medication. Drug therapy alone is
never sufficient to alleviate the suffering in PTSD, however, and
it appears to be useful only as an adjunct to psychotherapy for
this unique disorder. Nevertheless, it may provide some relief
by enabling the patient to participate more thoroughly in indi-
vidual, behavioral, or group psychotherapy.5 ° As a final note,
one should be aware of the side effects and contraindications of
some of these drugs.
What about the faker? In a diagnosis of PTSD, the attorney as
well as the psychiatrist must be able to differentiate the symp-
toms of posttraumatic stress from those of "compensation neu-
rosis," a fictitious illness complicated by unresolved monetary
claims,5 1 and "malingering," a deliberate simulation or exagger-
ation of an illness in order to avoid an unpleasant situation or to
obtain some type of personal gain.12 Both of these terms appear
in one way or another in almost all litigation involving posttrau-
matic stress disorder.
Compensation neurosis is regarded as an unconscious psycho-
logical factor that may contribute to an illness.5 3 There is no
question that it may exacerbate posttraumatic stress symptoms.
To a trained specialist, however, the symptoms of the faker are
sufficiently different from posttraumatic stress disorder symp-
toms, revealing themselves as a non-causative factor of the symp-
toms of posttraumatic stress disorder.54 While the incidence of
malingered psychiatric symptoms after an injury is unknown,
"pure malingering," the feigning of an injury that does not exist,
is thought to be uncommon in PTSD cases.55 The differential
diagnosis between PTSD and compensation neurosis turns on
the extent to which the neurosis has been created by a subjective
conviction on the part of the victim that compensation is appro-
50 See Matthew J. Friedman, Toward Rational Pharmacotherapy for Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder: An Interim Report, 145 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 281, 284 (1988).
51 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY, supra note 7, at 44.
52 Id. at 121.
53 The term "compensation neurosis" was used in the former DSM versions.
See DSM-III, supra note 9, at 303. In the DSM-IV, "compensation neurosis" has
been deleted, but the subject is embodied in the Differential Diagnosis sections
of PTSD and other Anxiety Disorders. See DSM-1V, supra note 8, at 427.
54 See Malvin Braverman, Validity of Psychotraumatic Reactions, 22 J. FORENSIC SCL.
654, 660 (1977).
55 See Paul Resnick, Evaluation of Malingering in PTSD, in POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS
DISORDER IN LITIGATION: GUIDELINES FOR FORENSIC ASSESSMENT 117 (1995); see
alsoJay Ziskin, Malingering of Psychological Disorders, 2:1 BEHAV. SCI & L. 39 (1984).
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priate. An experienced psychiatrist can diagnose symptoms as
being outside volitional control and determine if they will per-
sist in the victim whether compensation is awarded or denied. 6
Malingering, on the other hand, is deliberate. One author
classifies malingering as "a manifestation of crass, deliberate dis-
honesty - pure and simple."57 While there are occasions when a
fundamentally honest man finally succumbs to temptation and
commits a dishonest act, the degree of dishonesty necessary for
successful malingering is usually well-ingrained over a lifelong
period.58
Though this be madness, yet there is method in't.
- Hamlet59
The DSM-IV classifies malingering as an additional condition
that may be a focus of clinical attention and specifies that:
The essential feature of malingering is the intentional produc-
tion of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological
symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as avoiding mili-
tary duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial compensation, evad-
ing criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs.
Malingering should be strongly suspected if any combination of
the following is noted:
(1) Medicolegal context of presentation (e.g. the person is re-
ferred by an attorney),
(2) Marked discrepancy between the person's claimed stress or
disability and the objective findings,
(3) Lack of cooperation during the diagnostic evaluation and in
complying with the prescribed treatment regimen,
(4) The presence of an [additional disorder such as the behav-
ior of professional thieves, racketeers, or dealers of illegal
substance] 60
It is this author's observation that the mere mention of the
word malingering can be devastating to a plaintiff's case. Practi-
cally speaking, the mere allegation of malingering requires the
accused party to disprove the claim of deception. 61 The most
obvious cause for suspicion of malingering is the sufferer's over-
riding preoccupation with a financial recovery rather than a
56 See Andreasen, supra note 24, at 923.
57 BLINDER, supra note 20 at 187.
58 Id.
59 WILLIAM SHAKEsPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2.
60 DSM-WV, supra note 8, at 683 (emphasis added).
61 See, e.g., Roger Adelman & April Howard, Expert Testimony on Malingering: The
Admissibility of Clinical Procedures for the Detection of Deception, 2:1 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 5,
7 (1984).
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cure. The malingerer shuns treatment, especially if it is inconve-
nient. They are often deferential to psychiatrists and their law-
yers, whereas the true sufferer of the disorder showing apathy or
hostility will do so indiscriminately, even towards those who are
helping him. The malingerer's complaints often come and go
or are vague in nature. The malingerer may also have a history
of dependency and poor impulse control in contrast to the self-
reliant, accomplished type.62
The DSM-IV prescribes that malingering should be ruled out
whenever financial remuneration, benefit eligibility, and foren-
sic assessment play a role.63 The evaluating psychiatrist or psy-
chologist should be able to make a fairly good assessment of
whether the subject victim is malingering from a consideration
of the following:64
" Review of the progress notes of the person's therapists or
other care givers to observe any significant contradictions;
" Interviews of family members and close friends about re-
ported bad dreams, patterns of sleep, changes in sexual
interest, body movements during dreams,65 and capacity to
work;
" Whether the claimant is familiar with the term PTSD and
knowledgeable of its symptoms;
" Whether the claimant is evasive during the interview and
unwilling to make definite statements about returning to
work;
" Whether the person over-acts the symptoms (because ma-
lingerers are actors);
" Whether the person has a spotty employment record or
extensive absences from work;
" Whether the person depicts his or her pre-accident func-
tioning in exclusively complimentary terms;
" What the person's asserted capacity is with respect to work
as compared to recreation; The true PTSD victim with-
draws from recreational activities as well as work.
62 See BLINDER, supra note 20, at 186-87.
63 DSM-IV, supra note 8, at 427.
- See Resnick, supra note 55, at 120-25.
65 It was observed that posttraumatic nightmares are almost accompanied by
considerable body movement. See Bessel A. van der Kolk et al., Nightmares and
Trauma: A Comparison of Nightmares After Combat With Lifelong Nightmares in Veter-
ans, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 187, 189 (1984).
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" Whether the person isunwilling to volunteer information
about sexual dysfunction but eager to emphasize physical
complaints;
" How the claimant reports bad dreams. Malingers who do
not know the PTSD symptomatology may reply "I don't
know" when asked about nightmares. They may report
dreams of the exact occurrence, while the true PTSD vic-
tim's dreams generally vary;
* How the person follows advice and reacts to the idea of
appropriate drug therapy or other therapeutic advice.
There are some tests which can more objectively detect malin-
gering with a fair amount of reliability. The Minnesota Multi-
phasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is a widely accepted
objective test of personality used to distinguish between adjusted
people and people suffering from emotional or mental disabil-
ity. The Rorschach is a widely used projective technique for as-
sessing personality. Both have been used as valid indicators of
the presence or absence of malingering.6 The plaintiffs psychi-
atrist should be able to explain in detail the wide acceptance of
the clues and tests used, stressing the presence of the unique
DSM-IV symptoms and their debilitating effect. The malingerer
simply does not consistently exhibit the symptoms provided in
the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. The skilled psychiatrist or psy-
chologist (and often the attorney experienced in dealing with
PTSD victims) should be able to readily detect it.
Obviously, the selection of an experienced evaluating psychia-
trist or psychologist is crucial to any PTSD case. The considera-
tions that are embodied in this selection are many. Should a
psychiatrist or psychologist be chosen as an expert? The psy-
chologist, properly credentialed and experienced in treating
PTSD, may well be accepted by the court and sometimes prove
to be better communicators than psychiatrists.6 7 A common
complaint about psychiatrists is that they tend to over-use tech-
nical terms. Their fees are higher than those of psychologists
and are therefore targets of cross-examination that attempts to
show them as manipulating diagnoses for continuing economic
gain. So, the decision depends upon the individual's ability to
articulate the nature and extent of the injury in layman terms
6 See Adelman & Howard, supra note 61, at 17-18.
67 SeeJenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 643-44 (D.C. Cir 1962) (en banc);
see also People v. Davis, 402 P.2d 142, 147-48 (Cal. 1965) (providing that psycholo-
gists may testify as experts upon matters within the scope of their competence).
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with, of course, sufficient scientific support. I find it effective to
combine the psychiatrist's expert testimony with that of a treat-
ing psychologist.
In any event, the selection of the expert should not be made
without regard to the holding of the Supreme Court in the
Daubert68 case, its prodigy, and the varying state law criteria on
acceptance of expert testimony. In the federal courts, the for-
mer standard allowed the admission of expert testimony if it
were of the type "generally accepted" in the field.69 Essentially,
the Daubert court requires that the expert's testimony have a
"grounding in the methods and procedures of science" and
knowledge to connote a body of facts or ideas, accepted as
truths "on good grounds. ' 70 It must have "a reliable basis in the
knowledge and experience of his discipline" and be relevant,
providing a valid connection between the information proffered
and the issues involved.7' Under Daubert, the court is placed
more heavily in the role of a "gatekeeper" for expert testi-
mony.72 Daubert, however, provides few objective guidelines in
this process. It seems that the court must make some very sub-
jective determinations regarding expert testimony. In the case
of mental health care, it seems that the court is asked to apply a
"soft science" in determining the acceptability of another "soft
science."
In view of the varying decisions following Daubert and the vari-
ety of state court standards, the most effective gatekeeping will
be that which is self-imposed by the expert him or herself. One
author developed a comprehensive set of guidelines, modified
herein, that may be helpful in this field of expertise:
(1) Whether the witness is qualified to express an expert
opinion.
* Proper credentials?
* Did the witness directly examine the plaintiff?
* Has the psychiatric evaluation been comprehensive with
an identification of the complete database upon which
the diagnosis proffered?
68 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see gener-
ally various articles under the general topic of Behavioral Science Evidence in
Wake of Daubert in 13:2 BEHAV. Sci. LAW 127-291 (1995).
69 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-86 (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014
(D.C. Cir. 1923)).
70 Id. at 590.
71 Id. at 592.
72 See id. at 597.
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(2) Whether the facts upon which the expert relies are the
same type as relied upon by other experts in the field.
* Has clinical examination of the plaintiff established a
formal psychiatric diagnosis - e.g. conformity to DSM-IV
diagnostic criteria?
* Has the expert clearly explained the theoretical basis for
the diagnosis and opinion to be rendered?
* Will the expert be able to identify, explain, and apply
the major diagnostic studies available to substantiate the
diagnosis and opinion?
* Has there been any substantial reliance on novel proce-
dures which have not been generally accepted as valid
and reliable?
(3) Whether the expert's conclusion is based upon well-
founded methodology.
* Is there an established theory of causality?
• Is there a credible and understandable link among the
psychiatric symptoms, etiologic basis for these symp-
toms, and the legal issue to be considered?
* To what extent does the opinion derive from generaliza-
tions drawn from appropriate behavioral science data in
contrast to specific observable data generated in the
clinical evaluation?
(4) Whether the probative value of the testimony outweighs po-
tentially unfair prejudice.
* Will the opinion be relevant to the legal issue, or is its
purpose primarily to bolster the plaintiffs credibility on
collateral issues?73
Therefore, licensure as a physician who practices psychiatry or
psychology (even board certification in those subjects) may not
result in qualification as an expert on the subject of PTSD. 4
The expert's experience with PTSD must include a thorough
study of the vast number of studies, papers, and analyses made
on the subject, particularly those made within the last decade
leading up to and including the clinical application of the DSM-
IV. The expert who is well versed not only to testify but also to
73 See C. Robert Showalter, Distinguishing Science from Pseudo-Science in Psychiatry:
Expert Testimony in the Post-Daubert Era, 2 VAJ. Soc. POL'v & L. 211, 235-37 (1995)
(expanding on the four prongs of Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d
1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991)).
74 See Daniel W. Shuman, Current and Future Trends in Posttraumatic Stress Disor-
der Litigation, in POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER IN LITIGATION: GUIDEUNES FOR
FORENSIC ASSESSMENT 1, 7 (1995).
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make the original PTSD diagnosis, must be familiar with and
apply new developments in the observations of this disorder.
The expert must then be able to communicate to a jury the sig-
nificance of the studies and how they are considered in the diag-
nosis of this disorder if an effective case is to be made.75
Should an attorney use the treating physician as an expert?
Often the treating psychiatrist or psychologist can be made to
appear more credible to a jury than the "paid expert." This au-
thor has successfully used the following line of cross-examina-
tion of the defense expert to make that point:
Q: Doctor, you are not the treating physician in this case are
you?
A: No.
Q: You have no responsibility whatsoever for the continuing
care and treatment of [plaintiff]?
A: That is true.
Q: You were hired only to see the [plaintiff] once or twice
only for the purpose of this lawsuit?
A: Yes.
Q: And they are paying you to serve in that fashion, are they
not?
A: Yes.
Q: With regard to your own patients for whom you are respon-
sible as a doctor, have you had occasions where, through contin-
uing care and treatment, you have altered or supplemented
your diagnosis, both positively and negatively, as time went on?
A: Yes, that happens.
Q: Of course, through no fault of your own, you were never
given that opportunity .to do that with regard to [plaintiff]?
A: No.
Q: So, at least in that respect, would it be fair to say that, again
through no fault of your own, [plaintiff's treating physician] is
perhaps in a better position in that regard to come to a final
prognosis or evaluation?
A: Well, maybe.
Realistically, the treating physician may not always prove to be
the better expert. In fact, it is often a bad idea in mental disor-
75 In research, this author has discovered well over one-hundred books, papers
and studies on the subject of PTSD published since 1987, many available in the
American Psychiatric Association and National Library of Medicine libraries, lo-
cated in Washington, D.C.
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der damage issues to have the treating physician to act as the
expert for the following reasons. Independent evaluators are in
a better position to apply their skills impartially. When the treat-
ing doctor attempts to give a forensic evaluation, the doctor is
affected by a professional and personal bias to the patient. One
such conflicting activity is providing therapy, particularly psychi-
atric therapy, to the plaintiff. Therefore, the roles of the patient
ally and the impartial evaluator are too often inconsistent.76
When the treating physician serves as an expert, skilled defense
counsel may attempt to elicit an admission that when treating a
patient, the treating physician's interest lies primarily in the per-
ception of the patients's difficulties, not necessarily in objective
reality. In fact, the DSM-IV encourages clinicians to make diag-
noses based on self-reports, regardless of their accuracy, in or-
der to treat the patient effectively. The treating physician must
develop an atmosphere of trust with the patient, which is not
often accomplished by an objective fact-finding approach. It is
advisable, therefore, not to place the caregiver in a role that
conflicts with the doctor-patient relationship. It could prove to
be a detrimental to both the patient's treatment and the presen-
tation of the case to the jury. The forensic expert, on the other
hand, is usually free of these doctor-patient encumbrances. The
non-treating expert can review a variety of records and can
speak to a number of people who know the litigant. This expert
is less likely to be distracted from considering exaggeration or
malingering because of the absence of treatment bias. Also, he
is not placed in the position of being viewed as having a finan-
cial interest in recommending continuing treatment.
The experienced clinician hired to evaluate a case should
carefully check the client's medical and social background. It is
advisable for the plaintiff's attorney to obtain this information
first at the very outset of the case-preferably before filing the
complaint wherever applicable statutes of limitations permit.
One can rest assured that a prepared defense attorney will re-
quest the following:
* school records that may contain psychosocial information
* records of previous employment
* names of former spouses together with records of any di-
vorce or child custody proceedings
* private health insurance records
* all records from plaintiffs pharmacies
76 See Shuman, supra note 74, at 7.
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* any criminal history
" any history of alcohol or drug use
" any psychosocial or environmental stressors
" any present or past physical condition that could cause the
current symptomatology
* any involvement in unrelated suits or disputes.
It is important to gather this information, study it carefully,
and present it to the evaluating psychiatrist or psychologist so
that any of the negative aspects can be dealt with up-front. The
experienced psychiatrist or psychologist need not be reminded
of the questions to ask along the lines of the diagnostic criteria,
including those required for differential diagnoses.
On the other hand, it is important to prepare the client prop-
erly for an evaluation by the defense psychiatrist or psychologist.
Too often the uncanny defendant's physician may simply ask a
question like: "And what do you say the problems are that you
are now having?" The evaluator may avoid going through a cri-
teria checklist, expecting that the client should remember all of
the varying problems experienced, some of which may be even
delayed, masked, or intermittent. Often by avoiding specific
questions, the evaluation can simply report that the plaintiff
"did not report intrusive flashbacks, nightmares, etc.," attempt-
ing to infer that these symptoms do not exist, thus ruling out
PTSD. The following cross-examination was used by this author
to combat such an approach:
Q: Doctor, did you ask [plaintiff] if he had been experiencing
flashbacks or nightmares of the trauma?
A: As I said, he never reported any; otherwise, I would have
put it in my notes.
Q: Doctor, if [the plaintiff] reported these things to you,
would that have filled the criteria for finding of PTSD?
A: Yes, but since it was not reported, I had to rule out PTSD
according to our guidelines.
Q: Doctor, you did say that you examined the notes of the
treating physicians and plaintiffs expert as part of your prepara-
tion for your testimony here?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you not see that, among the many symptoms reported,
recurrent nightmares and intrusive flashbacks are being exper-
ienced by [the plaintiff]?
A: Yes, I believe I did see reference to that.
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Q: Did you not also see that among symptoms noted is an
impaired ability to prioritize and problems with short-term
memory?
A: Yes, I believe there is some reference to that.
Q: Doctor, in your experience with patients, do you often ob-
serve a patient who is trying to get well to try to minimize and
forget their problems even when asked about them?
A: Well, sometimes I have seen that.
Q: Doctor, in keeping your experience in mind, did you spe-
cifically ask [the plaintiff] whether he experiences intrusive
flashbacks or nightmares rather then relying on his memory?
A: Well, no, I thought that the way I asked the questions was
sufficient to get an honest answer.
Q: Doctor, if you had asked the specific question as it was
identified in the materials you reviewed, rather then relying on
his memory, might not that have elicited a positive answer?
A: Perhaps, I cannot say.
The above experience shows that it is imperative to brief the
client to go through a checklist approach when discussing
problems with the opposing psychiatrist or psychologist. It is
one thing to differ on a diagnosis that is very often subjective; it
is quite another to conduct the evaluation in a manner that fore-
closes the gathering of truthful, supporting data. Unfortu-
nately, the latter defensive approach is not uncommon.
A real challenge for the plaintiff is how to present expert testi-
mony of PTSD. It seems that no matter how well the expert is
able to communicate with and educate a jury, because the sub-
ject is beyond the range of common experience, the presenta-
tion of a PTSD case tends to sound too theoretical or clinical.
In a recent case involving a helicopter crash, one passenger suf-
fered PTSD, experiencing recurrent and intrusive flashbacks of
the event. The expert psychiatrist analogized the symptom to a
"broken record that plays over and over again with no control
over it." It was quite effective with this particular jury, at least
measured by the outcome of the trial.7" Perhaps a visual analogy
would be even more effective, such as "playing a part in a movie
over and over again without control over it." Using a mock jury
in preparation for the trial can provide some very useful feed-
back, for there is certainly room for invention in this area.
77 See Thomas v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 67 F.3d 308 (9th Cir.
1995) (tried by this author, the cite deals with liability, not focusing on the emo-
tional damages which the jury found in favor of the passenger).
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In this regard, the use of lay witnesses cannot be over-stressed.
As one author appropriately stated:
The key to proving psychic trauma lies in the hands of lay wit-
nesses: a neighbor of the plaintiff, a fellow worker, etc., three or
four people who knew him prior to injury as a well-functioning,
cheerful individual but see him now as a shattered man, suffused
with pain and despondency. Their 10-minute descriptions in
everyday jurors language of how he was then and how he is today
are worth an entire day's expert testimony."'
Juries do not always relate to experts, particularly in the
mental health field, and tend to be skeptical of things we cannot
see. Even a client, a survivor of an aircraft accident and a victim
of PTSD, remarked:
Who is going to believe a psychiatrist? Half of them need psychi-
atrists themselves. What am I going to do, show the jury the burn
on my arm? I am ashamed of it. After all, people got killed here.
But, nobody can understand what I am going through. How can
[the jury] ?
The client was right. Although he received a historically large
verdict, in personal observations by this author, it was a stroke of
luck. In a post-trial interview with the foreperson of the jury, the
foreperson told me how the jury discounted the experts until
one of the jurors in deliberation described his wife's emotional
condition resulting from an automobile accident. The foreper-
son told the other jurors how there was no physical injury, but
how it changed his wife's personality. "This is real," he told
them, and they believed him.80 In fact, a parade of lay witnesses,
friends, family members and business colleagues, describing in
detail the plaintiff's actions, accomplishments, disposition, and
personality before the accident in comparison with post-trau-
matic symptomatology, has proven essential to a fully successful
case. With this approach, the litigator can create a symbiosis
between the experts', the care givers,' and the lay witnesses' tes-
timony-each lending credibility to the other.
Is the DSM-IV criteria impervious to attack? The criteria has
provided the field of forensic psychiatry with predictable meth-
odology widely accepted by the mental health profession. It is
supported by a series of field trials sponsored by the National
78 BLINDER, supra note 20, at 188.
79 The case was Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
80 Post-trial interview with jury foreman in Washington, D.C. (1984).
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Institute of Mental Health in collaboration with the National In-
stitute of Drug Abuse and the National Institute on Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism.81 If necessary to establish the efficacy of
the use of the DSM-IV by an expert, documentation containing
the essential foundation for the development of the criteria is
contained in the DSM-IV Sourcebook. 2 In addition, many pa-
pers submitted to the working groups in an effort toward en-
hanced documentation in the DSM-IV, were published in peer-
reviewed journals.8 "
On the other hand, the DSM-IV proclaims itself to be simply
"a helpful guide to clinical practice." 84 It contains a "Cautionary
Statement":
The specified diagnostic criteria for each mental disorder are of-
fered as guidelines for making diagnoses, because it has been
demonstrated that the use of such criteria enhances agreement
among clinicians and investigators. The proper use of these cri-
teria requires specialized clinical training that provides both a
body of knowledge and clinical skills....
... The clinical and scientific considerations involved in categori-
zation of these conditions as mental disorders may not be wholly
relevant to legal judgments, for example, that take into account
such issues as individual responsibility, disability determination'
and competency.85
The DSM-IV criteria is largely derived empirically. As one au-
thor describes: "Committees of experts arrive at the diagnoses
included in the DSM. They reach agreement about a diagnostic
category, such as PTSD, and/or the criteria used to define it, by
consensus, or when that is not possible, by polling committee
members. 8 6
Despite the DSM-IV's wide acceptance, cross-examination
questions may still be valid relating to a history of disagreement
with the diagnosis of PTSD, the considerable number of
changes with the DSM over the years, the voting process by
which changes are made, and the fact that even more changes
81 See DSM-IV, supra note 8, at xix.
82 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION SOURCEBOOK FOR THE DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (1994).
83 Additional references include: ALLEN FRANCES ET AL., DSM-1V GUIDEBOOK
(1995), DSM-IV CASEBOOK, EKKIHARD OTHMER & SIEGLINDE C. OTHMER, THE
CLINICAL INTERVIEW USING DSM-IV (1994), and MICHAEL A. FAUMAN, STUDY GUIDE
TO DSM-IV (1994).
84 DSM-IV, supra note 8, at xv.
85 Id. at xxvii.
86 See Symes, supra note 6, at 195.
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are probably underway for future DSM revisions. Could these
future changes in retrospect alter a current diagnosis of PTSD?
The expert must be prepared for this line of questioning con-
cerning the DSM.8 7 Practically speaking, however, as a result of
decades of effort in categorization and development of a more
scientific approach for the mental care provider, the DSM-1V is
considered the "bible" and rarely will a treating or forensic psy-
chiatrist testify to the contrary.
Instead, the effective defense often centers around an attack
on causation - the causal link between the traumatic event and
the plaintiffs symptoms. Because of the difficulty in refuting
whether or not the plaintiff is actually experiencing the claimed
nightmares, intrusive thoughts, avoidance, increased arousal, or
other PTSD symptoms, the defense may well shift to an attack
on causation, questioning whether the symptoms were due to
psycho-social stressors rather than the subject event, or caused
by pre-existing personality disorders, or other similar factors.
Other stressors in the person's life, unrelated to the alleged
traumatic incident, may produce symptoms similar to those of
PTSD. Because the defense will be expected to attack causation,
the plaintiff must be prepared for a thorough pre-trial examina-
tion of his or her personal life in very intimate detail.
The defense must be careful, however, not to create the argu-
ment for the plaintiff that the traumatic event exacerbated a
pre-existing condition. At the outset of the case, it is important
to know the applicable law on the application of the "eggshell"
concept in regard to mental or emotional condition."8 It is a
widely accepted legal principal that you must take the plaintiff
as you find him, regardless of whether the same injury would
not have occurred in the so-called normal person." But when it
comes to mental or emotional trauma, some jurisdictions may
not allow a recovery for the "supersensitive" or predisposed
87 For a good checklist of cross-examination questions on the reliability and
validity of the DSM, see David Faust & Jay Ziskin, Challenging Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder Claims, 38 DEF. L.J. 407 (1989); see also JAY ZISKIN & DAVID FAUST, COPING
WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (4th ed. 1988).
88 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 (1964).
89 See, e.g., Pierce v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 823 F.2d 1366, 1372 (9th Cir.
1987) ("The eggshell plaintiff rule simply means that a tortfeasor takes his victim
as he finds him.").
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psyche.9 ° Defense counsel must be cautious to determine this
well before the trial.
A frontal attack on the true PTSD victim on the stand is a
gamble that can literally backfire, as in the following example:
A forty year old woman received a serious cut in her calf mus-
cle when an improperly secured floor hatch on a boat gave way,
allowing her leg to fall through the flooring while cruising near
one of the remote Bahama islands. She was a nurse by profes-
sion, so she calmed down everyone on the boat while holding
pressure on the deep wound. When she was carried to a doctor
ashore, she even assisted in cleansing the wound and explained
to the doctor (who was not skilled in surgery) how to run the
stitches. After a year of treatment back home, she was still not
able to walk well because the accident apparently caused nerve
damage, forcing her to forego nursing. Within a month after
the injury, she began to experience nightmares, panic attacks
when seeing a boat or hearing sounds of engines of all kinds,
flashbacks, and fits of temper at the slightest provocation. She
was diagnosed with PTSD and began treatment from a
psychologist. 1
In the trial of her case, she presented herself quite well,
proudly explaining her efforts on how she was getting her life
back together as much as she could. The defendant's insurers,
however, maintained throughout the case that her, if not most,
PTSD claims were bogus and fashioned their defense strategy on
that theme. At first, the defense attempted to attribute her
problems to an event many years before the boat accident
wherein she successfully fought off a molester. Then, during re-
petitive cross-examination that kept bringing her back into the
boat, defense counsel, in a feeble effort to refresh her recollec-
tion of where her feet were placed in the boat as they were un-
derway, showed her a life size blow up of the hatch opening into
which her leg fell. Her whole complexion changed as she
screamed out in horror as though she were cut all over again.
She had to be escorted off the stand by her mother on one side
and her attorney on the other. When she resumed the stand an
hour later, her answers to the cross-examination were literally
9o Compare Theriault v. Swan, 558 A.2d 369, 372 (Me. 1989) (denying such re-
covery) with Padget v. Gray, 727 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no
writ) (allowing for such recovery if foreseeable).
91 See id.
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babble as she was actually shivering with fright. The jury re-
turned a $1.3 million dollar verdict.9 2
CONCLUSION
It is obvious that claims of PTSD associated with tort actions
have increased in number and in kind over the last ten years."
What the future holds for PTSD litigation depends upon the
changing rules in various jurisdictions governing recovery for
nonphysical harm. It also depends on developments in the diag-
nostic nomenclature. Mental disorders are regarded with less
and less skepticism as knowledge gained through a more scien-
tific approach increases. The care and treatment of these disor-
ders are coming out of the dark ages and gaining wider
understanding and acceptance by the public at large. There is
no question that the law will follow, making it imperative for all
lawyers dealing with personal injury cases to maintain a working
knowledge and skill of this important subject.
92 See Stanley v. Bertram-Trojan, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 541, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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